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Does an overdraft facility influence the customer costs of using a personal current 
account?   
 
Abstract 
This study examines if personal current accounts offering an overdraft facility costs 
customers’ less to use than accounts not offering this service. This analysis uses a 
UK data set of 222 personal current accounts, recorded monthly between 1995 and 
2011 in combination with interest rates from 1,200 instant access deposit accounts 
offered contemporaneously by the same firms. Our results indicate personal current 
accounts offering overdraft facilities have higher deposit and payment service costs 
than accounts not offering this service; a finding robust to varying service attributes. 
This result is inconsistent with suggestions that overdraft users have been cross-
subsidising other personal current account users as widely reported in theoretical 
and policy literatures. It is concluded that implicit and inertia costs of personal 
current account use may be more influential than previously reported in the pricing 
of these accounts. 
 
Key words: Checking accounts, Personal current accounts, Contingent charges, Implicit 
costs, Interest rate setting, Overdrafts. 
G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages  
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Introduction 
The pricing of add-on or contingent services provided in addition to a base good has been the 
focus of much theoretical and policy speculation. This study examines the customer costs 
associated with providing one such add-on good, bank overdrafts which are offered as an 
additional service for personal current accounts (also termed checking accounts)i. We examine 
this question by testing if the explicit and implicit costs of using personal current accounts 
varies significantly with whether the account offers an overdraft facility or otherwise. Explicit 
customer costs include packaged fees for accessing the account and implicit costs are defined 
as the difference in interest rate yields offered on personal current account deposits and yields 
from instant access deposit accounts offered contemporaneously by the same provider. This 
assessment, augmented by consideration of a wide range of service attributes, employs a data 
set of 222 personal current accounts and 1,200 deposit accounts offered monthly between 1995 
and 2011 in the UK.  
Using a descriptive assessment and regression model, we report providing an overdraft facility 
is significantly associated with the customer costs of using base services (deposit and payments 
services) in personal current accounts. The direction of this relationship is not, as a widely 
predicted, from overdraft services to other personal current account users. Alternatively the 
presence of an overdraft facility increases the customer costs of using current account base 
services. This assessment indicates that implicit or inertia costs of personal current account use 
may be more influential than previously reported in the pricing of these services. 
The research question is important to address as academics and policymakers have reported 
overdraft users may subsidise other personal current account customers. For example 
Armstrong and Vickers (2012) report ‘financially  constrained customers pay contingent fees 
which help fund the free service offered to those in credit  - (this) might appear to some as a 
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kind of “reverse Robin Hood exercise”’ (p.479)ii. These sentiments have also been raised 
repeatedly by legislators and regulators across the globe. For example within the UK, the House 
of Commons Treasury Committee (2011, paragraph 80) reported ‘… so-called free banking 
has important distributional consequences. A minority of consumers, often those on lower 
incomes, pay explicit charges associated with overdrafts. This results in high prices and poor 
outcomes for a sub-set of consumers. Meanwhile, other consumers, often on higher-incomes 
do not pay explicitly for their current account provision’.  
Examining this question in the UK is timely as while a diversity of approaches are used to price 
personal current accounts internationally, the ‘free banking’ pricing model, dominant in the 
UK since the 1980s, is increasingly being used in Ireland, Australia and the USA (see Central 
Bank of Ireland 2012, Australian Senate 2011, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2013). 
In this payment model, the customer pays for personal current account ‘base services’ 
indirectly and compensates the provider directly for overdraft use through contingent fees and 
additional charges. The indirect costs of using base (deposit and payment services) services 
include depositing funds in personal current accounts receiving relatively low levels of interest 
and the payment of merchants or interchange fees by retailers (see Schmiedel et al. 2012). 
Increasingly these indirect costs for accessing personal current account base services have been 
augmented by the promotion of accounts with a ‘packaged’ fee payable for accessing the 
account.  
Regulators and legislators in Australia (Australian Senate 2011), the European Union 
(European Commission Directorate-General for Competition 2006; Commission of the 
European Communities 2009), Ireland (Central Bank of Ireland 2012), the United Kingdom 
(Competition Commission 2008; Office of Fair Trading 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2013 
[hereafter OFT]; House of Commons Treasury Committee 2011) and the USA (Federal Deposit 
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Insurance Corporation 2008; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2013) have all reported 
concerns with the provision and the pricing of personal current accounts and associated 
overdraft services within a ‘free banking’ context. While, this international policy discussion 
has been accompanied by notable theoretical (Armstrong and Vickers 2012), legal (Whittaker 
2011) and US empirical contributions (e.g. Fusaro 2008, 2010; Stango and Zinmann 2009a,b, 
2014; Fusaro and Ericson 2010), there is a paucity of empirical evidence examining how 
personal current accounts services are priced in nations where ‘free banking’ is the dominant 
pricing model.  
This study contributes to this debate by considering if the provision of an overdraft facility in 
a personal current account affects the customer costs of using such an account. If the 
assumption that overdraft lending is cross-subsidising other personal current account services 
is reliable, we would expect the customer costs of using payment and deposit (base) services 
of personal current accounts offering an overdraft facility to be lower relative to accounts which 
do not offer such a facility. As this relationship is not observed for the UK personal current 
market over a 17 year period, this regulatory, policy and theoretical assumption may require 
further analysis. We suggest inert customers which accumulate large deposits in their personal 
current accounts may be paying far more for personal current account services than previously 
acknowledged.     
The study is divided into five sections. After this introduction, academic literatures are 
examined. In the third section the data and empirical design are introduced and the results are 
discussed in the fourth section. The conclusions and implications of the study are then 
provided.      
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Literature review  
In light of the preceding discussion, any literature review of personal current accounts and 
overdraft costs could consider a diversity of concerns and for compactness we examine three 
areas. Initially we review the developing theoretical literatures pertaining to contingent charges 
and how these have been applied to personal current account markets. Secondly, the empirical 
work undertaken on the provision of, demands for and the pricing of personal current account 
services are outlined. Lastly we consider the past regulatory examinations of this market with 
a focus on UK contributions.  
  
Theoretical literature on contingent charges and current account pricing  
Contingent charges, such as overdraft costs, are applied to goods and services purchased in an 
aftermarket, in addition to and after a base good or service is obtained through a primary 
market. While contingent charges provide pricing efficiencies for firms by allocating costs to 
those customers using additional services, they also present challenges. In particular concerns 
arise when firms can exercise market power over an aftermarket and levy high contingent 
charges and fees.   
Shapiro (1995) reports four circumstances when market power within aftermarkets develops. 
Initially, customers may be surprised by firms unexpectedly raising prices in aftermarkets; an 
outcome leading customers to switch provider when possible. Secondly, if customers are 
poorly informed and fail to account for the costs of using aftermarkets due to optimism or the 
costs of comprehending charges, firms can maximise profits from an aftermarket. This may 
result in firms escalating competitive actions in the primary market to obtain additional 
aftermarket customers (Bennett 2011). Third, when firms have a limited ability to make 
credible or binding price and quality commitments at the time of the base good purchase, 
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incentives for firms to maximise profits in aftermarkets arise. Lastly, if the firm is able to 
exclude rivals from aftermarkets, the ability to price discriminate is enhanced.  
Concerns have also emerged that firms may also exaggerate customers’ decision making biases 
through contingent charging. This assumption is central to an expanding theoretical literature 
assessing the market interaction between profit maximising firms and ‘boundedly rational’, 
‘myopic’, ‘naïve’ or ‘less informed’ consumers. This work considers the firms’ strategic use 
of confusing pricing schemes to enhance consumers’ decision errors.  For example Gabaix and 
Laibson (2006) indicated circumstances where exploitation of customers’ weakness in 
comprehension and decision making by firms may persist under competitive conditions in the 
joint pricing of base and add-on goods. Subsequently cross subsidies may flow from profits 
achieved on add-on goods purchased by less informed customers, to subsidise base goods 
purchased by all customers. In the presence of myopic customers high rents in aftermarket or 
add-on good markets persist even in the face of increasing base market competition (Miao 
2010).  
As financial services markets are characterised by limited consumer comprehension and 
financial literacy (FSA 2006, Worthington 2007, Agarwal et al 2008) and personal current 
accounts markets are associated with high switching costs and employ a diversity of pricing 
formats, this theoretical literature appears apposite for this market. Despite this relevance, links 
between this market and such theory have been piecemeal, with the notable exception of 
Armstrong and Vickers (2012). These authors examined the pricing of overdrafts viewing these 
services to be a tied aftermarket complimentary yet distinct from primary or base personal 
current account services (deposits and payment services). The model assumes customers are 
confronted by small print or confusing pricing formats when choosing a personal current 
account. Diligent customers’ which can observe this small print and comprehend pricing 
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formats, can take inefficient actions to choose a personal current account with the lowest 
overall usage costs. Distinctly naïve customers are misled by small print and confusing pricing 
formats and unnecessarily incur fees. As these naïve customers will be unaware of high 
overdraft costs, they will choose the lowest cost provider of base personal current account 
services (deposit and payment services) unaware of the additional or contingent charges for 
overdraft use. 
These differential actions for naïve and diligent customers result in two possible outcomes. If 
there is a large proportion of naïve customers and the aftermarket prices are high, firms will 
actively compete in the primary market for personal current accounts and charge more for 
additional overdraft services. These actions result in overdraft use subsidising the personal 
current account base services and naïve customers subsidising diligent customers. This 
outcome raises concerns as to inefficient patterns of pricing being created and the redistribution 
of costs between customer groups. Alternatively, if there are enough diligent customers or low 
enough contingent charges then efficient contract terms will develop and no cross-subsidy will 
emerge. As, 
 
Empirical literature on pricing current accounts  
To date there is a scarcity of non-US academic work examining personal current accounts and 
overdraft pricing. In the UK past examinations of the personal current account market have 
generally addressed concerns other than the costs of account use. These studies have examined 
topics including the transmission of monetary policy (e.g. Heffernan 2002), the switching of 
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current accounts (e.g. Gondat-Larralde and Nier 2006; Morgans 2010) and financial exclusion 
(e.g. Devlin 2005). A limited number of studies have also considered personal current account 
pricing in Canada (Seldon and Solmer 1996), the Netherlands (Cunha et al. 2011) and 
Scandinavia assessing topics including the pricing of transactional and deposit services 
(Merrigan and Nomandin 1996; Klee 2008; Tin 2008) and the costs of payment services used 
within current accounts (Humphrey et al. 2003; Guibourg and Segendorff 2007)iii. Within the 
Australian context, Worthington (2007) examined the distribution and comprehension of 
current account characteristics and pricing formats. 
In the USA the academic literature is more extensive, examining pricing for payment service 
use, such as the number of cheques written (e.g. Ederington and Skogstad 1977; Mingo 1980; 
Osborne and Wendel 1981), assessing overdraft demands (Boyd 1976; Bar-Ilan 1990), 
customer switching (Kiser 2002) and convert pricing (McGovern and Moon 2007). More 
recently overdraft pricing and use has been examined using in a number of studies using 
transaction data from individual customers’ personal current accounts (e.g. Stango and Zinman 
2011a,b, 2014; Fusaro 2008, 2010; Fusaro and Ericson. 2010). These studies support the 
conjecture that overdraft use is primarily accidental and personal current account customers’ 
could have minimised the payment of additional fees through more prudential financial 
management. Fusaro (2008) reports distinct categories of overdraft users exist and possess 
differing abilities to navigate these markets, with some customers very able at minimising the 
costs of overdraft use. Stango and Zinman (2011a) report that while only 31% of personal 
current account customers have had at least one overdraft fee, a further 72% of customers have 
been very close to over-drafting behaviours and displayed financial fragility. Similarly, Fusaro 
(2008) reports that on average one in five customers incur an overdraft each year and over a 10 
year period 46.2% of customers incur overdrafts.  
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Regulatory contributions 
The personal current account market has also been the focus of repeated regulatory attention 
in the UK and internationally. This has resulted in a distinct literature examining overdraft 
costs and usage, current account pricing and the competitive conditions prevailing in the 
personal current account and associated overdraft markets. For the UK these inquiries have 
been influenced by the fragmented and dynamic regulation of this market over the sample 
period. Deposit or banking elements are currently regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) and were regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) during the sample period. 
The credit element of overdrafts was regulated by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the 
payments system considered by the Payments Council and competition issues addressed the 
OFT and the Competition Commission throughout the sample period, before being transferred 
to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).  
Regulatory reports on the personal current account market have therefore emerged from many 
sources. This market has been examined as part of wider examinations of UK banking (e.g. 
HM Treasury 2000, the House of Commons Treasury Committee 2011, Independent 
Commission on Banking 2011). Reports have also examined specific services provided within 
personal current accounts including overdrafts (OFT 2008, 2011, 2013, 2014; CMA 2014) and 
deposit services (FCA 2014b) as well as distinct markets including small business banking 
(Competition Commission 2002) and Northern Ireland (Competition Commission 2007). 
Persistent concerns raised in these reports have included limited customer switching, high 
barriers to entry and complex pricing formats.   
Within this array of reports perhaps the most significant intervention was provided by the now 
defunct Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in its investigation as to the competitive conditions 
prevailing within the unauthorised overdraft market (OFT 2008, 2011, 2013, Competition and 
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Markets Authority 2014). This competition and consumer protection agency reported that the 
unauthorised overdraft market and the personal current account market were not working well 
due a lack of transparency and complexity in pricing, which concentrated competition on more 
visible fees and charges. The ‘free banking’ pricing model was considered to result in relatively 
low interest rates for deposits within personal current accounts and overly high levels of interest 
and fees for overdraft lending. This scenario troubled this regulator as it was assumed the poor, 
vulnerable and less aware customers were disproportionally incurring overdraft fees. Legal 
action ensued as to the fairness of unauthorised overdraft charges with a case between the OFT 
and seven banks leading to rulings that bank overdraft charges are unfair by the High Court 
and the Appeal Court before eventually being rejected by the Supreme Court in 2009 (see 
Whittaker 2011).  
In 2011 the OFT also announced a further review of competition within and operation of the 
personal current account market (OFT 2011). This report outlined new standards for firms 
supplying overdrafts to be prescribed in the Lending Code. Lastly, the OFT (2013) evaluated 
changes within unsecured overdraft markets arising from past regulatory changes. It was 
reported the costs of using unauthorised overdraft services and the underlying profitability of 
these services had fallen by £928m. This reform process was recently re-examined by the 
successor to the OFT, the Competition and Markets Authority (2014) which has reported high 
barriers to entry and inert customers persist in this market. 
Regulatory interest in personal current account pricing has also been international in scope with 
investigations and reforms of personal current account markets undertaken in Canada, 
Australia, the USA and the European Union. Canada has introduced the right of all customers 
to have a bank account that can be used for payment services (excepting in cases of suspected 
or past fraud) and measures to standardise the calculation and disclosure of current account 
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fees (Ministry of Justice 2003). In Australia, legislation has been undertaken to outlaw unfair 
charging structures including penalty charges on current accounts. Regulatory developments 
in the USA include the introduction of Regulation E (Electronic Fund Transfers) by the Federal 
Reserve Board (Federal Register 2010) prohibiting financial institutions from charging 
customers for overdrafts incurred from ATMs and one-time debit card transactions unless 
consent is obtained or the customer opts to pay such fees. The Commission of the European 
Communities (2009) has also reported a high variance and lack of clarity in the costs of 
personal current accounts across the European Union. 
 
Data and Methodology  
To address whether an overdraft facility influences the cost of personal current account use we 
undertake a descriptive assessment and employ a regression model. The descriptive assessment 
examines the relationships between the cost of personal current account use, the services 
received with the accounts and the availability of an overdraft facility or otherwise. The 
regression model is used to examine statistical significance of the presence or otherwise of an 
overdraft facility on the costs of personal current account ‘base’ (deposit and payment services) 
services in the presence of attributes of personal current accounts.  
 
Assumptions and Concepts  
In order to undertake the assessment three assumptions are made and require explanation. 
Initially the costs of using deposit and payment services within personal current accounts are 
defined as base costs. These base costs vary between the personal current accounts as accounts 
will have varying interest levels offered for current account deposits, distinct packaged fees 
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and may levy these fees and pay interest with different frequencies (i.e. monthly, annually etc.).  
For reasons outlined in the data section, overdraft costs are not directly quantified and the 
presence or otherwise of an overdraft service is used to reflect the cost or benefit of providing 
this service.   
Second, to accommodate the opacity of charging for personal current accounts, we measure the 
implicit costs of account use. Implicit costs are those costs of using personal current accounts 
which are not clearly linked to a form of action and include the relatively low yield received 
on personal current account deposits relative the yield received on funds deposited in different 
financial services. While implicit costs are commonly recognised as a major cost to personal 
current account users (e.g. Stango and Zinman 2009a; Central Bank of Ireland 2011; 
Independent Commission on Banking 2012) and have been used in other economic contexts 
(see Fixler 2009) these costs have either been overlooked or quantified relative to the market 
rate of funds in past assessments of personal current accounts.  
In this study we adopt a distinct approach to estimating implicit costs. Specifically we calculate 
the difference between interest received on personal current account deposits relative to the 
average interest receivable by depositing the credit balance in an average instant access deposit 
account offered contemporaneously by the firm providing the personal current account. This 
enables comparison of the costs of a customer opting to accumulate deposits within their 
personal current account or choosing to deposit or sweep funds into an average instant access 
deposit account offered by the same bank. This approach reflects the benefits of automatic 
transfers between current and deposit accounts advocated in the USA to enhance interest 
payments and reduce overdraft use by banks (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2013). 
Further this approach provides a measure of customer costs arising due to inattention and 
inertia (see Anderson et al 2014, Stango and Zinman 2014).   
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A third assumption underlying the analysis is that the costs of using base services are 
determined by how the personal current account is used by a customer. Preferably customer 
use is defined using personal current account transactions. As this data is not publically 
available in the UK we consider an alternative method previously used by regulators (e.g. 
Competition Commission 2008; OFT 2008; Central Bank of Ireland 2011; Independent 
Commission on Banking 2011). This representative customer approach, creates a hypothetical 
customer with actions and levels of service use representative of how customers behave on 
aggregate.   
In total three representative customer definitions which use both base and overdraft services 
are outlined (with costs only recorded for base costs in the analysis). To reduce subjectivity in 
defining the levels of customer use, we adopt one existing OFT (2008) representative customer 
classification derived from a prior assessment of personal current account transaction data. We 
also follow the approach used by the Competition Commission (2008) to define two further 
representative customers by interviewing senior bankers with a remit for personal current 
account provision. Interviews were therefore undertaken with four senior representatives from 
a very large and a small provider of UK personal current account services and led to two more 
representative customer definitions. These definitions are outlined in Table 1.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Data  
The empirical analysis employs data from Moneyfacts PLC for the retail personal current 
account market and the instant access deposit market. This data was accessed from paper based 
magazines and transformed into a useable dataset for this project. The data is comprehensiveiv, 
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includes personal current accounts with and without packaged feesv, includes basic bank 
accountsvi and accounts with and without an overdraft facility. All these accounts provide a 
deposit facility and offer some payment services (so are defined as personal current accounts 
rather than deposit account). These accounts are provided primarily by high street banks, yet 
also by building societies, small banks, foreign banks and other firms including insurers and 
retailers. For personal current account deposit services we record four different tiers or levels 
of interest payable for sums deposited including:  
i) Equal to and greater than £1 deposited and less than £500, 
ii) Greater than or equal to £500 deposited and less than £1,000,  
iii) Greater than or equal to £1,000 and less than £2,500, and,  
iv) Greater than or equal to £2,500 and less than £5,000.  
While some personal current accounts offer higher rates of interest for sums greater than £5,000 
deposited this data was not reported by Moneyfacts PLC and was not available for this study. 
Therefore this assessment is effectively truncated to considering personal current accounts 
containing £5,000 in deposits or less. The frequency of interest rate payment is also recorded 
and used to ensure any calculations undertaken match the frequency employed by the personal 
current account (i.e. monthly, quarterly and annually). Where a personal current account 
requires a packaged fee, the fee amount and frequency of fee payment was recorded. Data is 
also recorded as to how personal current accounts are distributed and what payment services 
are provided by these accounts. These product characteristics (e.g. account sweeping, cheque 
book, unlimited direct debits etc.) are not comprehensive due to the availability of data, yet 
assist in indicating the differential quality of personal current accounts offered to market. We 
acknowledge that other forms of distribution, payment services and additional services are not 
included in this assessment.  
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While considerable data on overdraft interest rates, buffers, arrangement and usage fees has 
been obtained for authorised and unauthorised overdrafts, we have been unable to collect a full 
set of data relating to additional fees for customers using unauthorised overdrafts, such as letter 
costs, rejected direct debit and cheque costs. As the omission of unauthorised overdraft charges 
will understate the level of unauthorised overdraft use costs and we do not wish to interpolate 
data, these values are not included in this assessment.    
 
     INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Using the approach specified above, ‘representative’ customers are used to calculate the base 
costs of personal current account use. The Moneyfacts data set is provided monthly over a 17 
year period, for 345 current accounts offered by 71 firms, which are owned by 61 parent 
companies. This data is truncated to only include those personal current accounts for which 
both personal current account and instant access deposit observations are available and where 
personal current accounts have been offered for two years or more. The removal of data where 
matching instant access deposit and personal current accounts observations were unavailable, 
primarily affects smaller and foreign banks. We have also removed personal current accounts 
which were only offered briefly. Some accounts may have been offered for purely marketing 
purposes such as obfuscation (Carlin and Manso 2010) or bait and switch activities (Lazear 
1995) and their inclusion could have distorted the analysis. This provides a contiguous data set 
of 222 products offered by 42 firm and 34 parent firms; in total 16,667 observations within an 
unbalanced panel of 222 products and 204 months over a 17 year period. The panel is 
unbalanced as firms have introduced and withdrawn products over the sample period.  
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To estimate implicit costs these personal current account observations are matched with the 
average interest rates available for the instant access deposit accounts provided by the same 
parent company. The instant access deposit data has 56,909 monthly observations of 1,200 
instant access deposit accounts. Descriptive statistics of fees and interest rates used to calculate 
base costs of current account use and implicit costs of current account use are presented in 
Table 3.  
The unit of observation for the analysis is therefore the cost of using a particular personal 
current account. This is recorded monthly over the sample period for 222 products for the three 
representative customers. The decision to use the product rather than the firm level as a unit of 
observation is informed by the relatively frequent merger and acquisition of personal current 
account providers over the sample period (see DeYoung et al. 2010). This has resulted in many 
personal current account products changing ownership yet continuing to operate with the same 
brand name and product features. The parent firms (ultimate owners) marketing these personal 
current accounts are listed in Appendix 1.  
Table 3 outlines descriptive statistics of the variables employed and indicates why the approach 
to quantify implicit prices is followed. In the upper panel of the table we report the mean and 
dispersion of personal current account pricing, product features, forms of distribution and the 
average interest rates of the instant access deposit accounts. In total, 160 personal current 
accounts (71% of observations) have and 62 personal current accounts do not have an overdraft 
facility. Three of the personal current accounts altered the availability of overdraft facilities 
throughout the sample period. The average duration of a personal current account in the sample 
is 75 months with a standard deviation of 44 months. Packaged fees are levied on 76 personal 
current accounts (67% of observations) with an average fee of £18.31 per month. The 
availability of payment services also varies across the data. Overall 24% of observations have 
account sweeping, 78% have a cheque book and 98% have unlimited direct debits. Further, 
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89% of personal current account observations are available through branches, 83% over the 
telephone and 67% are available via the internet.  
     INSERT TABLE 3 
The lower panel reports the construction of implicit costs for the three representative 
customers. Initially, three sets of interest rate: a) the interest rate of the personal current account 
deposit service, b) the average interest rate of an instant access deposit account and c) the 
prevailing base or policy rate are reported. The yield from depositing three levels of funds 
(£830, £2,000 and £400 for representative customers A, B and C) is then calculated using the 
appropriate interest rate and frequency and is reported as the average annual yield. These yields 
vary from very low returns on personal current account deposits to higher returns from average 
instant access deposit accounts and the highest returns from depositing at the base rate. The 
implicit customer costs of using a personal current account deposit relative to sweeping these 
funds into an instant access deposit account or depositing these funds at the base rate is then 
recorded. It is observed that implicit costs are far higher when base rates are used, suggesting 
the use of base rates may overestimate implicit costs. As access to retail deposits actually 
offering the base rate is unusual and due to the relatively high implicit costs arising when this 
rate is used, the level of implicit cost is defined as personal current account deposit yield minus 
the average instant access deposit yield.        
 
Methods  
The descriptive assessment examines whether a personal current account offering an overdraft 
facility or otherwise affects the costs of using base services. This question is examined for the 
three representative customers and accommodating the ‘quality’ of personal current account 
services. The first part of this assessment is undertaken overall and for three time periods (1995-
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99, 2000-04 and 2005-11). We then use quartiles denoting relative customer costs to examine 
personal current accounts which do and do not offer an overdraft facility. If overdrafts, as ‘add-
on’ services, do reduce the price of base services, it is expected more personal current account 
observations which have an overdraft facility will be recorded in the lowest cost quartile. 
Similarly, a higher percentage of observations of personal current accounts without an 
overdraft facility would be expected in the highest cost quartile. This assessment is reported in 
Table 4. 
High costs of using base personal current account services may also reflect differences in the 
quality of these accounts. Therefore we examine if variables denoting ‘quality’ of personal 
current accounts and the base costs of using these accounts are associated. This is again 
undertaken overall and using quartiles denoting relative customer costs. In the quartile analysis 
we discriminate between higher and lower quality by counting the number of forms of 
distribution and total number of payment services offered on each personal current account 
observation. When a personal current account is available through all forms of distribution and 
offers all the possible payment services it is denoted as having a higher quality. Where a 
personal current account is offered through a limited number of distribution channels and 
provides few payment services it is judged to be of a lower quality.  
Lastly, we examine whether the firm offering the personal current account may be accruing 
economies of scale. As the personal current accounts examined are provided by firms with 
varying involvement in the UK retail banking market just examining asset size of institutions 
could provide a misleading perspectivevii. We therefore represent scale of involvement within 
retail banking markets through examining whether the firm has a national branch network or 
otherwise, following the classification used by Ashton and Gregoriou (2014) and reported in 
Appendix 1. The differences in base costs for customers A, B and C for nationally branching 
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firms and other institutions are recorded together with the assessment of product quality in 
Table 5.  
The regression ‘test’ follows the descriptive assessment and is used to determine if the 
availability of an overdraft facility in the personal current account has an influence on the costs 
of using accounts’ base services. If the availability of an overdraft facility influences the cost 
of base services then a dummy variable indicating whether the personal current account 
observation has or does not have an overdraft facility would be expected to be significant. If 
the presence of an overdraft facility reduces the cost of using base services, then the expected 
coefficient sign will be negative. If the presence of an overdraft facility is costly for a bank to 
provide the expected direction of the coefficient would be positive.   
The costs of using personal current account base services for the three representative customers 
are also assumed to be determined by a range of other factors including the wholesale cost of 
funds, the services offered within the personal current account, product restrictions and how 
the personal current account is distributed. The panel data model to be estimated is written as:  
Yit = i + Xit+ft + uit      (1) 
where i (i = 1, 2,…, n) denotes personal current account products, t (t = 1, 2,…, T) denotes 
months, Yit is the it
th observation of the dependant variable (personal current account base costs 
for the three representative customers) and Xit is the it
th observation of the explanatory variables 
outlined in Table 2.  represents the coefficient vector of the explanatory variables, ft represents 
the time effects in the model and the error term uit may be written as uit = i + it where i 
represents the time invariant individual specific effects and it denotes the remaining error.  
To determine the appropriate estimator for the regression we undertake a number of steps. As 
financial institutions and their subsequent product decisions are exposed to similar kinds of 
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systematic shocks, we test whether cross-company residuals are contemporaneously correlated. 
By computing the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic, LM we test 
for contemporaneous error correlations using: 
1
2
2 1
n i
LM ij
i j
T r

 
   ,     (2) 
where 
2
ijr  is the squared ij
th correlation coefficient of cross-company residuals. Under the null 
of no contemporaneous error correlations across the companies, the test statistic is 
asymptotically 2  distributed with N(N-1)/2 degrees of freedom, where N denotes the number 
of firms in the panel. The p-value of the LM test statistic is zero, which rejects the null 
hypothesis, suggesting that the error series are contemporaneously correlated across all the 
products for each of the representative customers.  
In light of these results commonly used fixed effects panel estimators are not applicable to our 
econometric analysis because they do not encapsulate the contemporaneous correlation across 
all the products in our sample. The decision also reflects a growing unease within the 
econometric literature as to the widespread and potentially inappropriate application of fixed 
effects estimators (see Vogelsang 2014). Also, panel estimators that capture endogeneity and 
joint determination of variables such as the Generalized Method of Moments estimator derived 
by Blundell and Bond (1998) are not relevant to our dataset. This is because a vast majority of 
our explanatory variables are dummies, which are by definition exogenous explanatory 
variables. We therefore adopt the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) econometric 
methodology in our empirical analysis.  
We accept the panel could be considered to be a three dimensional panel consisting of products, 
firms and time. We control for products in the cross section and for time within the panel. We 
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cannot encapsulate the firm effect as well, yet do account for shocks to firms by using the SUR 
estimator. We could in principle control for firms in the cross section instead of the products 
but that would limit our analysis to 42 cross sections instead of 222, which would make our 
empirical estimates significantly weaker. This testing framework therefore examines the 
dependent variable, the costs of personal current account use for the three representative 
customers, over 222 products and for 204 time periods.   
 
 
Results  
The descriptive assessment  
The descriptive assessment is reported in two tables. Table 4 considers the influence of offering 
an overdraft on the costs of using base personal current account services (upper panel) and 
differences in customer costs in quartiles (lower panel). The differences between the ‘quality’ 
of personal current account services and whether an account provides an overdraft facility or 
otherwise is provided in Table 5. In the upper panel of this table, the differences between these 
costs of using base services are indicated for accounts with and without overdraft facilities. In 
the middle panel the distribution of higher and lower ‘quality’ personal current accounts are 
recorded relative to whether the account offers an overdraft facility or otherwise. In the lower 
panel, the relationship between firms with and without a national branch network and the base 
costs is recorded.   
 In Table 4 we observe when a personal current account is offered with an overdraft, the costs 
of using base services are higher. These differences are significant using t tests. There is also a 
higher dispersion of customer costs when personal current accounts have an overdraft rather 
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than when not. The assessment of the customer costs using quartiles supports this general 
finding. For the majority (75%) of cells, there are relatively more observations from accounts 
with no overdrafts rather than otherwise in the lowest cost quartile. For the highest cost quartile 
there are relatively more observations for personal current accounts offering an overdraft 
facility. We also test if these distributions of observations are independent using a 2 test; in 
all cases, independence is rejected.   
In Table 5 we examine the differences between the ‘quality’ of personal current accounts when 
an account offers an overdraft facility or otherwise. It is reported that more personal current 
account payment services are observed when an account offers an overdraft. Personal current 
accounts providing an overdraft facility are also accessible through a greater number of 
distribution channels be these branch, telephone or over the internet, relative to accounts not 
offering overdrafts. In all cases the differences between the occurrence of these service 
attributes and whether the account is offered with and without an overdraft are significant. The 
quartile assessment of distribution of higher and lower ‘quality’ personal current accounts bears 
out this observation and we see the highest quality quartile is overwhelmingly populated by 
personal current account observations offering overdraft facilities. The hypothesis that this 
distribution is independent is rejected in all cases using a 2 test.  
Lastly, the relationship between base costs and firms with and without a national branch 
network is examined. When considering firms with a national branch network relative to other 
firms, national branching firms offer a higher proportion of personal current accounts with an 
overdraft (73% to 62%). It is reported that national branching banks have higher average base 
costs for all representative customers.  We acknowledge this scale influence can be interpreted 
in different ways.  This could indicate economies of scale are not a strong influence in this 
assessment and this marketplace. Alternatively, the downward pressure on customers costs 
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exercised by offering an overdraft could reflect a scale effect affecting this entire market and 
distorting these results.   
Overall, from the descriptive assessment a mixed picture is forwarded. In our discussion of 
theory, it was predicted a personal current accounts offering an overdraft would be expected to 
have lower base costs. The findings reported in Table 4 contradict this prediction as a positive 
relationship between offering an overdraft in a personal current accounts and base costs is 
reported. This result is further complicated by the existence of personal current accounts with 
different levels of service quality. We observe that personal current accounts offering an 
overdraft also provide more product features and are available through more distribution 
channels. We do not observe evidence supportive of the predictions of the theory.  
In Table 6 we report the regression results. The coefficient for a personal current account 
offered with overdraft services is statistically significant at the 5% level for all representative 
customers. The direction of the relationship is positive indicating providing an overdraft facility 
adds rather than reduces the costs of using base services. The regression model also indicates 
other factors have a statistically significant influence on the costs of using personal current 
account base services. The method of distributing current accounts positively influences the 
costs of using base services with statistically significant and positive coefficient values for all 
branch and telephone variables, yet not for internet distribution. The provision of payment 
services such as account sweeping, cheque books and unlimited direct debits also has a positive 
and significant influence on the costs of using base services. The influence of the base rate on 
the cost of using base current account services is statistically significant for two of the three 
representative customers and negative in all cases. Lastly, the fixed and time effects are 
significant, suggesting that the product and time-specific shocks differ significantly across the 
accounts in our sample justifying the use of the panel. 
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Conclusions  
Despite the theoretical and policy importance of contingent charges, empirical examination of 
the operation and level of these pricing techniques is limited. Perhaps reflecting this lack of 
empirical investigation, the distribution of customer costs arising from contingent charges has 
become an issue of public, political and policy concern in some markets and particularly in the 
provision of personal current accounts and overdraft services. In this market, policy makers, 
parliamentarians, regulators and theorists have all reported the provision of overdraft lending 
in a ‘free banking’ system can lead to a cross-subsidy of all personal current account users from 
customers opting to use overdraft services. This study empirically examines an aspect of this 
prediction by testing whether offering an overdraft facility or otherwise is associated with 
higher or lower costs of using personal current account base services.   
The descriptive assessment reports the customer costs of using personal current accounts with 
an overdraft facility are higher rather than lower. This relationship is complicated by the 
‘quality’ of the personal current account. We therefore undertake a regression assessment of 
what factors influence the base costs of customer use of personal current accounts. It is reported 
that having an overdraft is positively associated with the customer costs of using personal 
current accounts. Many other factors also have a positive influence on current account costs 
including variables used to represent product quality and distribution. These results do not 
concur with theoretical predictions that overdrafts, as an overpriced ‘add-on’ service are 
predicted to reduce the costs of personal current account base services. Alternatively the 
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provision of personal current account services appear to be financed as much by implicit costs 
arising from inattentive customers allowing large deposits to accumulate in their accounts.  
Personal current accounts are used by 95% of the Australian (ANZ 2011) and 90% of the UK 
population (OFT 2008); indeed across the European Union the ubiquity of these services is 
demonstrated by a customer base greater than that using telephone services, both mobile and 
fixed line, or even a gas supply (Commission of the European Communities 2009)viii. These 
markets also contribute a significant proportion of bank revenue; in the case of the UK there 
were some 65 million active personal current accounts generating revenues of £8.1 billion for 
their providers in 2013 (Competition and Markets Authority 2014). When a market is this 
economically and socially important, clarity and comprehension as to how customer costs are 
incurred and the efficiency of pricing is essential. Central to on-going public debates 
surrounding personal current accounts is the assumed subsidy being paid by overdraft users to 
other customers which do not use these services. This view is associated with the high levels 
and costs of overdraft lending internationally and the disproportionate use of overdraft services 
by the inattentive, vulnerable (Financial Conduct Authority 2014a) and the poorix. Despite the 
prevalence of this assumption, it is not universally agreed that overdraft users are the sole 
source of any subsidies; these could also be related to payment service usage or customer inertia 
(Mullineux 2009). 
Much of the policy discussion about this market reflects concerns with the substantial levels of 
overdraft borrowing observed in many nations, the less ‘visible’ nature of this borrowing to 
many inattentive and less affluent users (see Financial Conduct Authority 2014a) and the often 
complex and potentially confusing format of overdraft pricing. Policy developed 
internationally to address these concerns has focused on the timeliness and clarity of 
information and empowering customers to opt into or from overdraft provision. For example, 
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in the UK the Lending Code (2011)x has included an expectation personal current account 
providers will inform customers when they are about to enter into an unauthorised overdraft 
and provide the ability for customers to actively opt out of unauthorised overdrafts. Regulatory 
developments in the USA include the introduction of Regulation E (Electronic Fund Transfers) 
by the Federal Reserve Board (Federal Register 2010) prohibiting financial institutions from 
charging customers for overdrafts incurred from ATM and one-time debit card transactions 
unless consent is obtained or the customer opts to pay such fees.  
While such ongoing policy efforts to enhance customer information and choice are welcome, 
we suggest these should be accompanied by measures to reduce the implicit and inertia costs 
of personal current account use. Specifically, the default enrolment of customers into systems 
of automatic redirection or sweeping of funds to and from deposit accounts will lessen implicit 
costs and minimise overdraft charges. Lastly, further research of pricing formats is required. In 
this study we observe that the implicit costs of deposit use, the least visible personal current 
account costs appears to be substantial. These concerns with the pricing of less visible fees, 
charges and benefits, previously raised by regulators (e.g. OFT 2008, 2011, 2013) and within 
theory (  Piccione and Spiegler 2012) is clearly an important area for further 
investigation. 
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Table 1: Representative customers and use of current accounts  
Label Group Description 
Credit 
balance 
Credit 
days 
AOD 
Balance 
AOD 
Days 
UOD 
Balance 
UOD 
Days 
A 
Typical 
customer 
with 
unauthorised 
overdraft 
A typical average 
credit balance and 
an unauthorised 
overdraft 
£830 345 0 0 £40 20 
B 
High credit 
customer 
with 
overdraft use 
A high credit 
customer for all 
except 3 weeks a 
year when an 
authorised 
overdraft is used 
£2,000 344 £500 21 0 0 
C 
Marginal 
customer 
with 
overdraft use 
In credit for all 
except 3 weeks a 
year when an 
authorised 
overdraft is used 
£400 344 £800 21 0 0 
Notes AOD = authorised overdraft; UOD = unauthorised overdraft  
 
  
34 
 
Table 2.  The expected relationships between personal current account (PCA) base 
costs and product features.   
Bank or Product 
Feature 
Influence on Personal Current Account Base Costs  
Current account 
offered with an 
overdraft 
The direction of the relationship depends on whether offering an overdraft 
positively or negatively influences the customer’ costs of using current 
accounts.  
Average wholesale 
cost of funds  
The average base or policy rate issued by the Bank of England for the month 
considered. If the market is linked to the cost of funds then a significant 
positive influence is expected.  
Account sweeping If customers have a facility to automatically sweep excess current account 
funds to another financial account (such as a deposit account), the size of 
current deposits will be curtailed. This will therefore be costly for the bank 
and have an expected positive influence on the base costs.  
Cheque book The ability to use cheques is additional convenience for customers, yet costly 
to provide. Therefore a positive relationship is expected.    
Unlimited direct 
debit 
This indicates if there are no restrictions on the use of the direct debit system 
through the UK BACS payment system. This is expected to exert a positive 
influence on base costs. 
Distribution of 
PCA branches, 
internet and 
telephone   
The use of one or a combination of distribution channels are expected to have 
differing influences on base costs depending on their costs to provide. 
Branches are widely viewed to be the highest cost and internet provision the 
lowest cost forms of distribution.  
Minimum credit 
balance.   
If the current account requires customers to pay their primary income into 
this account. This requirement is expected to have a negative influence on 
base costs as it will be associated with a higher use of the deposit function, 
yet also may add to the costs of payment services.    
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Personal Current Accounts (PCA).       
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Sample features 
PCA Offered with Overdraft Services (%) 71.0 45.4 0 1 
PCA Product Tenure (months) 101.23 50.90 24.00 204.00 
Personal current 
account (PCA) 
pricing 
Interest rate £1 deposited (%) 0.66 1.31 0.00 9.57 
Interest rate £500 deposited (%) 0.68 1.33 0.00 9.57 
Interest rate £1000 deposited (%) 0.77 1.39 0.00 9.57 
Interest rate frequency (p.a.) 6.82 5.07 1.00 12.00 
Fee(£) 5.01 17.17 0.00 195.00 
Fee frequency (p.a.) 2.98 5.14 0.00 12.00 
Product features 
Account sweeping (%) 24.5 43.0 0.00 1.00 
Cheque book (%) 78.4 41.2 0.00 1.00 
Unlimited direct debits (%) 95.0 22.8 0.00 1.00 
Minimum credit balance (£) 101.17 547.92 0.00 5000.0 
Distribution (%) 
Branch 89.0 31.3 0.00 1.00 
Telephone 83.4 37.2 0.00 1.00 
Internet 67.1 47.0 0.00 1.00 
Instant Access 
Deposit Interest 
Rates (%) 
£500 deposited 2.22 1.23 0.03 5.75 
£1000 deposited 2.30 1.26 0.03 5.75 
£2500 deposited 2.47 1.27 0.03 5.75 
Customer Annual Yields Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Annual measures 
of  implicit cost 
(without fees) 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
A 
PCA deposit rate (£) 
5.44 10.65 
PCA deposit cost 
relative to instant 
access deposit (£) 
12.24 12.94 
B 14.80 26.81 29.1 31.5 
C 2.50 5.06 
5.12 6.06 
A 
Instant access deposit 
rate (£) 
17.68 9.88 
B 43.90 24.20 
PCA deposit cost 
relative to base 
rate (£) 
27.8 19.18 
C 7.62 4.90 
A 
Base rate (£) 
33.24 17.05 65.05 46.26 
B 79.86 40.96 
C 15.97 8.19 13.47 9.27 
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Table 4:  The influence of offering an overdraft facility on the base costs of using 
current accounts.   
Annual usage costs of base current account services 
 Customer Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
All current  accounts 
A £46.406 £69.246 -£54.58 £720.39 
B £63.265 £72.158 -£125.52 £720.94 
C £39.286 £69.597 -£25.63 £720.19 
Current accounts offering 
overdrafts 
A £57.577 £71.938 -£41.77 £343.71 
B £74.103 £75.010 -£100.35 £405.01 
C £50.871 £72.235 -£19.92 £321.00 
Current accounts not 
offering  overdrafts 
A £22.64 £58.15 -£54.58 £720.39 
B £40.59 £62.71 -£125.52 £720.94 
C £14.84 £57.99 -£25.63 £720.19 
Differences between accounts 
offering and not offering overdrafts Customer A Customer B Customer C 
t tests 25.87** (0.00) 22.88** (0.00) 26.35** (0.00) 
 Customer A Customer B Customer C 
Quartiles of 
base costs 
With 
Overdraft 
Facility 
No 
Overdraft 
With 
Overdraft 
Facility 
No 
Overdraft 
With Overdraft 
Facility 
No 
Overdraft 
Highest 4 27.06 18.58 28.86 12.77 27.02 18.71 
Overall 
3 26.09 21.49 26.16 21.24 24.87 25.41 
2 25.77 22.50 26.44 20.35 23.62 29.46 
Lowest 1 21.08 37.42 18.54 45.64 24.48 26.42 
 2 89.70** (0.00) 255.15** (0.00) 25.87** (0.00) 
Highest 4 13.03 0.32 29.94 11.23 34.09 6.88 
1995-99 
3 33.22 43.35 14.24 35.13 13.60 42.25 
2 22.45 37.34 26.44 33.54 20.26 35.92 
Lowest 1 31.30 18.99 29.38 20.09 32.05 14.95 
 2 296.33** (0.00) 346.53** (0.00) 735.39** (0.00) 
Highest 4 34.52 2.50 34.12 3.41 34.34 34.34 
2000-04 
3 22.82 30.18 22.96 29.82 22.91 22.91 
2 12.20 16.24 20.15 36.52 20.18 20.18 
Lowest 1 30.46 51.08 22.77 30.25 22.57 22.57 
 2 1005.9** (0.00) 945.02 (0.00) 981.36 (0.00) 
Highest 4 33.52 4.19 32.71 6.18 33.57 4.09 
2005-11 
3 21.00 34.77 21.81 32.81 19.72 37.91 
2 22.47 31.16 23.47 28.74 22.63 30.81 
Lowest 1 23.00 29.88 22.01 32.27 24.09 27.19 
 2 1610.7** (0.00) 1316.47 (0.00) 1753.33 (0.00) 
 
37 
 
Table 5: Relationship between offering an overdraft facility, current account ‘quality’ and firm size.  
 All accounts 
Accounts offering 
overdrafts 
Accounts offering no 
overdrafts 
t tests Difference 
between with and 
without O/D  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Average Wholesale cost of funds (%) 4.13 2.11 4.14 2.09 4.01 2.10 n/a 
Account sweeping (%) 24.5 0.430 29.9 45.8 15.6 36.2 14.004**    (0.00) 
Cheque book (%) 78.3 0.412 88.4 32.1 50.5 50.0 45.538**    (0.00) 
Unlimited Direct Debit (%) 95.0 0.218 98.4 12.4 86.7 34.0 10.324**   (0.00) 
Distribution of PCA through Branches (%) 89.0 0.313 90.7 29.1 84.6 36.2   4.289**     (0.00) 
Distribution of PCA through Internet (%) 67.1 0.470 71.9 45.0 66.4 47.2 24.293**   (0.00) 
Distribution of PCA through Telephone (%) 83.4 0.372 92.7 26.1 60.9 48.8 24.864**    (0.00) 
Minimum Credit Balance (£) £101.17 £547.92 £7,568 £56,754 £244.20 £793.31 -18.244**   (0.00) 
Quartiles of 
current account 
quality 
Overall 1995-99 2000-04 2005-11 
With Overdraft 
Facility 
No 
Overdraft 
With Overdraft 
Facility 
No Overdraft 
With Overdraft 
Facility 
No 
Overdraft 
With Overdraft 
Facility 
No Overdraft 
Highest 4 22.63 6.51 0 0 24.62 3.48 31.11 10.29 
 
3 32.69 20.27 0 0 42.76 16.93 41.13 28.49 
2 34.24 31.28 66.99 4.80 24.06 35.94 25.83 36.75 
Lowest 1 10.44 41.94 33.01 95.20 8.56 43.64 1.93 24.46 
 2 2428.80** (0.00) 936.53** (0.00) 1140.34** (0.00) 1523.39** (0.00) 
Annual usage costs (£) of base current account services  Customer Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
For depository institutions 
with national and 
multimarket branching 
 
 
% PCAs 
offering 
Overdrafts 
73.19% 
A 48.75 68.27 -54.58 604.44 
B 66.28 71.12 -125.52 610.66 
C 41.62 68.83 -25.63 602.13 
For depository institutions 
with regional or local 
branching 
62.0% 
A 36.49 72.42 -14.06 720.39 
B 50.39 75.11 -44.49 720.94 
C 29.30 71.93 -12.15 720.19 
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Table 6: Regression Results – Effect of offering an overdraft services on the cost of 
using current account base services     
Variable SUR Estimates 
Customer A 
SUR Estimates 
Customer B 
SUR Estimates 
Customer C 
Constant  30.77 (12.16)**  15.53 (5.53)**  33.32 (13.48)** 
Overdraft Facility   45.22 (32.84)**  41.62 (28.68)**  46.68 (34.00)** 
Base Rate  -4.62 (-11.72)**  -0.07 (-0.17)  -6.50 (-16.52)** 
Account Sweeping   3.09 (2.35)**   4.15 (3.00)**   3.48 (2.65)** 
Cheque Book -23.16 (-14.07)** -25.49 (-14.80)** -23.30 (-14.20)** 
Direct Debit -11.44 (-8.60)**   -5.50 (-3.55)** -11.44 (-8.83)** 
PCA Branch   20.45 (15.00)**  27.64 (16.63)**  17.63 (13.80)** 
PCA Internet    0.57 (0.45)   2.61 (1.87)*   1.21 (0.97) 
PCA Telephone  15.55 (11.17)**  20.97 (14.07)**  14.11 (10.19)** 
Credit Balance   0.018 (8.81)**   0.018 (9.05)**   0.018 (8.79)** 
ai (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
bt (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SE 64.48 68.15 63.94 
R2 0.13 0.11 0.16 
Observations 16676 16676 16676 
 
Notes: SE represents the standard error of the panel estimator. ai and bt are the fixed and time effects. 
The (.) are p values, (.) are t statistics, ** and * indicates significant at the 5 and 10% level respectively.  
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Appendix: The parent firms supplying personal current accounts used in the study.  
 
Abbey National* Charterhouse Bank Julian Hodge Bank Santander* 
AIB Chase KBL Schroder 
Airdrie Savings 
Bank 
Chelsea Building 
Society 
Kleinwort Benson State Bank of India 
Alliance and 
Leicester* 
Citibank Laiki Bank/Marfin 
Laiki Bank 
Sun Life of Canada 
American 
Express 
Co-operative* Leeds and Holbeck 
Building Society 
Tridos Bank 
Arbuthnot 
Banking Group 
Coventry Building 
Society 
Leopold Joseph & 
Sons Ltd 
TSB* 
Bank of China Cumberland Liverpool Victoria 
Friendly Society 
Turkish Bank 
Bank of Cyprus Danske Bank Lloyds* Weatherbys 
Bank of Ireland Dao Heng Bank Manchester 
Building Society 
Wesleyan 
Assurance Society 
Bank of 
Scotland 
Dresdner Benson Metro Bank Western Trust 
Banque 
d'Escompte 
Fleming Premier 
Banking 
National Australia 
Bank* 
Whiteaway 
Laidlaw Bank 
Barclays* Halifax* Nationwide 
Building Society* 
Woolwich* 
Bristol and West HBOS* Natwest Yorkshire Building 
Society 
Britannia HFC Finance 
(Household 
International) 
Northern Rock* Zurich Financial 
Services Group 
Butterfield 
Private Bank 
Hoare and Co Norwich and 
Peterborough 
Building Society  
Caledonian 
Building Society 
HSBC* Portman Building 
Society  
Cater Allen 
Private Bank 
Investec bank Royal Bank of 
Scotland*  
* = National branch networks.  
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i The personal current account or checking account market is characterised by the use of different 
terminology internationally due to distinct laws, regulations and traditions as to how retail banking 
business is undertaken. As the subject of the paper is the UK, terminology from the UK is employed 
employing terms widely used in this nation and employed in law, regulation and government reporting. 
For example a personal current account (PCA) is a term used to describe a bank account offering 
payment services, such as direct debits and credits, standing orders and other forms of payment, deposit 
services and in many cases an optional overdraft facility. The term personal current account has long 
been used in nations with a UK banking heritage and refers to bank accounts similar to ‘checking 
accounts’, a term more widely used in North America. Other UK terms employed in this study include 
‘instant access deposit’ – this is a deposit account offered by financial intermediary for the deposit of 
funds which may be accessed without prior notice being given to the bank. These accounts are also 
termed sight deposits in some other nations. Packaged or access fees are the fees payable for accessing 
some personal current accounts. Authorised and unauthorised overdrafts is borrowing undertaken 
through the personal current account with and without prior agreement of the provider. Throughout the 
study we refer to the deposit and payment services provided within a personal current account as a base 
good and an overdraft facility as an add-on service which is provided through an overdraft aftermarket.  
ii Many other academics have also reported the presence of a distributional cross-subsidy in personal 
current or checking account markets. For example Campbell et al (2010) stated ‘consumers may choose 
a bank account with “free” checking, underestimating the extent to which they will pay penalty fees for 
overdrawing their accounts in the future. Such lack of self-knowledge leads to several problems. First, 
naïve consumers may purchase too many bank services because they underestimate the total cost to 
them. Second, banks compete away the excess profits they obtain through overdraft fees by keeping 
base charges low on checking accounts. This implies that naïve consumers cross-subsidize 
sophisticated consumers who don’t overdraw their accounts.’ (p.11). Policy reports have also reported 
personal current account penalty fees are not equally shared between customers. For example in the 
Australian context overdraft costs ‘are disproportionately borne by those who can least afford to pay 
them, namely low income customers’ (Rich 2004, p.11). Cross-subsidies have also be reported in other 
financial services markets. For example Schuh et al (2010) examine the presence of cross-subsidies in 
US credit card markets.   
iii While discussion of the wider functions of the payments system is beyond the scope of this study, 
reviews are provided for the UK and Nordic nations by Milne (2006) and for the USA by Gerdes (2008).     
iv The data provided by Moneyfacts PLC is also used by financial and competition law regulators in the 
UK including the Bank of England and the Competition Commission in addition to providing a key 
source of comparison for many UK based financial institutions and financial advisors. This data has 
been provided since 1989, yet has only been provided in a consistent format for personal current 
accounts since 1995.      
v Packaged accounts are personal current accounts which are provided on payment of a fee. It is common 
for these personal current accounts to offer a range of different payment services, be distributed through 
an assortment of channels and offer a range of additional services such as travel or identity insurance.     
vi Basic bank accounts are personal current accounts developed and issued in the UK to combat financial 
exclusion amongst certain and often less wealthy individuals. These accounts offer limited payment 
services and often do not provide access to overdraft services.   
vii For example, some large North American institutions, such as Sun Bank or Citi operate in the UK on 
a relatively small scale.  
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viii These markets are also substantial in other nations. For the USA, Parrish and Frank (2011) reported 
consumers paid $23.7bn in overdraft fees in 2008; an increase of 35 per cent since 2006 ($17.5bn) 
suggesting multiple concerns arising in this market. 
ix These concerns are international in scope. For example in the USA the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (2013, p.18) reported ‘…. consumers from potentially vulnerable groups may shoulder a 
disproportionate share of NSF (non-sufficient funds) and overdraft fees and checking account costs’. 
The Australian Senate report on competition in retail banking (2011, paragraph 4.69) also reported 
contingent bank fees from overdraft use may fall disproportionately on the poor and ‘poorer customers 
who do pay fees subsidise their wealthier counterparts on a per transaction basis’. 
x Full details of the Lending Code are available from the Lending Standards Board 
(www.lendingstandardsboard.org.uk/). 
